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This is the third installment in our series about the current crisis. The first article ex-
amined the conventional view that this is a finance-led crisis, a turmoil triggered and 
exacerbated by “financial excesses.”1 The second debunked the “mismatch thesis,” 
the belief that the present crisis is our punishment for letting financial fiction distort 
economic “reality.”2 The current paper takes on the notion of the forward-looking 
investor. According to the conventional creed, investors are forever looking into the 
future: they discount not profits that have already been earned, but those that they 
expect to earn. This forward-looking premise lies at the heart of modern finance, and 
investors usually follow its rituals with religious zeal.  
But not always.  
Occasionally, capitalism is struck by a systemic crisis, a period in which the very 
existence of the system is put into question. And when that happens, all bets are off. 
Capitalists lose sight of the future, and forward-looking finance suddenly collapses.  
   
Takeoff 
 
Consider the current moment.  
On the face of it, the capitalist class is finally seeing the light at the end of the 
tunnel. For a few months now, its analysts, statisticians and public officials are spot-
ting “green shoots” everywhere they look. The snowballing global recession, they 
say, seems to have slowed down. Managers the world over are purchasing more in-
puts after a long period of buying less; Asian exporters are beginning to put some 
factories back to work; raw material prices have stabilized, and some are beginning 
to rise; bank lending is slowly reviving, and home owners are starting to refinance 
their mortgages at lower rates; and in the United States, the world’s biggest producer-
consumer, initial unemployment claims seem to have peaked and consumers are be-
ginning to loosen their purse strings. But the most important sign comes from the 
equity market: stock prices are the ultimate barometer of capitalist health, and they 
are soaring. 
                                                 
1 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, “Contours of Crisis: Plus ça change, plus c’est pa-
reil?” Dollars & Sense, December 31, 2008. 
2 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, “Contours of Crisis II: Fiction and Reality,” Dollars 
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Figure 1 


























NOTE: Indices denote month-end closing prices. They are ex-
pressed in $U.S. and rebased with January 2002=100. The last data 
points are for May 31, 2009. 
 
SOURCE: Datastream (series codes: TOTMKWD(PI) for the 
world stock market index;  TOTMKUS(PI) for the U.S. stock mar-
ket index; FINANUS(PI) for the U.S. FIRE index).  
 
The market takeoff is evident in Figure 1. The chart traces the U.S. dollar price 
of three key indices – all world equities, U.S. equities, and the equities of the U.S. 
FIRE sector (finance, insurance and real estate). All three indices show a sharp, syn-
chronized rise. In just three months, from February to May, the world index gained 
33%, the U.S. index 25%, and the U.S. FIRE index – previously the most battered of 
the three – a whopping 46%.  
Suddenly, the bulls are everywhere. The greatest returns are usually earned dur-
ing the initial part of a rally, and no respectable fund manager likes being beaten by a 
rising average. With the economy apparently bottoming out and with the market 
having been in a major bear phase for nearly a decade, investors are no longer afraid 
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of losing money; their fear now is not making enough of it.3  And so arises the specter 
of “panic buying,” a frenzied attempt to jump on the bandwagon before the really 
large gains are gone.4 
Of course, not everyone buys this rosy scenario. Many observers feel that the re-
cent stock market rally is no more than a dead-cat bounce. In the eyes of the pessi-
mists, investors are knee-jerking to a false start. The economic recovery, they say, 
will be W-shaped, and the market will re-collapse before any real boom can begin. 




Regardless of who is right, though, there is something fundamentally wrong with the 
debate itself. The current news may be good or bad, revealing or misleading – but, 
then, investors aren’t supposed to take their cue from the current news in the first 
place.  
To trade assets on the basis of today’s statistics is to be backward looking. It is to 
be retrospective rather than predictive, to react rather than initiate, to trail rather than 
lead. It puts investors at the tail end of social dynamics. 
Needless to say, such behavior is entirely improper.  
According to the sacred annals of modern finance, formalized a century ago by 
Irving Fisher and popularized during the Great Depression by Benjamin Graham 
and David Dodd, asset prices are forward looking: “The value of a common stock,” 
dictate Graham and Dodd in their 1934 immortal doorstopper, “depends entirely 
upon what it will earn in the future.”5  
These lines were written against the backdrop of the 1920s. The roaring stock 
market and the accompanying optimism ushered in by the end of the First World 
War offered a fertile breeding ground for “new-era theories,” especially in the land of 
limitless possibilities. The principles of discounting gained adherents, and soon 
                                                 
3 Given the extent of the crash, some strategists started to speak of an imminent bull run al-
ready in late 2008. But the bulk of the pack remained in watchful waiting, and it is only now, 
after the market had finally turned, that run-of-the-mill analysts claim they have anticipated it 
all along. For a historical examination of major bear markets and subsequent bull runs, see our  
“Contours of Crisis: Plus ça change, plus c’est pareil?”  
4 “A long-unheard phrase was on the lips of many equity traders during this week’s market 
rally – panic buying. Even after two months of steady gains for stocks, there were few signs of 
investor fatigue – indeed, the overriding sense was the fear of being left behind. . . . ‘You could 
say there was an element of panic about it – there were a lot of underweight players driving the 
market higher out there,’ said Tony Betts, senior sales trader at CMC Markets in London. ‘We 
clearly reached a situation where the bears felt they had suffered enough punishment’” (Dave 
Shellock, “Investors Willing to Dive Back into the Fray,” Financial Times, May 8, 2009). 
5 The quote is from Benjamin Graham and David L. Dodd, Security Analysis, 1st ed. (New 
York and London: Whittlesey House McGraw-Hill Book Company Inc., 1934), p. 307-9. 
Fisher’s analysis of present value is articulated in The Rate of Interest. Its Nature, Determination 
and Relation to Economic Phenomena (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1907). 
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enough past profits became passé. They no longer mattered for the stock market. 
From now on, declared the gurus of finance, one should view the markets “from the 
standpoint of eternity, rather than day-to-day.”6 Looking forward, the only thing that 
counted was the future trend of earnings. 
This forward-looking emphasis – the notion that asset prices discount the deep 
future – is now sacrosanct. Over the past half-century, this view has been published 
and republished in millions of articles and monographs, reproduced endlessly in fi-
nance textbooks, embedded deeply in computer models and hardwired into pocket 
calculators. Every accountant, analyst and capitalist accepts it as an article of faith. It 
is beyond dispute. 
But, then, if asset prices depend on the future trend of earnings, why worry about 




Every investor is conditioned to know that crises come and go with remarkable regu-
larity and that recession always gives way to expansion, so what’s the point of fol-
lowing the latest news on green shoots, commodity prices, or the actions and inac-
tions of purchasing managers and policy makers? Although these immediate news 
items may be important for journalists, politicians and even economists, their impact 
on the long-term trend of profit is negligible – so why should they be of any concern 
to dominant capitalists and their prescient analysts? 
And, sure enough, most of time the latter don’t seem to care.  
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the dollar price and dollar earnings per 
share of the S&P 500, a group representing the largest listed corporations in the 
United States. The series are monthly, with price calculated as the monthly average 
of daily closings, and earnings per share computed as the average for the past 12 
months (both series are normalized, with September 1929=100). The data go back to 
the 1910s and are plotted against a logarithmic scale to facilitate visual inspection.7 
Now, if one takes a century-long view, equity prices seem to move more or less 
together with earnings per share. But from a shorter perspective, the fit is very loose 
and often negative. The chart shows that the variations of the two series are usually 
out of sync, that their magnitudes are often very different, and that there are ex-
tended periods during which they move in opposite directions. 
                                                 
6 Benjamin Graham quoted in Jason Zweig, “Be Inversely Emotional, Not Unemotional,” The 
Wall Street Journal, May 26, 2009, p. 28. 
7 A logarithmic scale amplifies the variations of a series when its values are small and 
compresses these variations when the values are large. This property makes it easier to 
visualize exponential growth (note that the numbers on the scale jump by multiples of 10).  
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Figure 2 
























NOTE: Earnings per shares denote net profits per share earned in 
the previous twelve months. Both series are expressed in $U.S. and 
rebased with September 1929=100. The last data points are De-
cember 2008 for earnings per share and May 2009 for price.  
  
SOURCE: Robert Shiller 
(http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/ie_data.xls retrieved on 
June 5, 2009). Stock price data are monthly averages of daily clos-
ing prices. Monthly earnings are interpolated from annual data be-
fore 1926 and from quarterly data after 1926. 
 
Theorists of finance don’t consider this loose association problematic. On the 
contrary, they see it as fully consistent with their basic model. According to this 
model, investors price an asset by discounting the future profits the asset is expected 
to generate. In this ritual, investors set the price of the asset – say a share of Micro-
soft – as equal to the ratio between what they expect Microsoft’s future profits to be 
on the one hand, and the rate of return they wish those profits to represent on the 
other. For instance, if investors expect ownership of a Microsoft share to generate a 
perpetual profit stream of $100 annually, and if they want this stream to represent a 
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20% rate of return, then they would be willing to pay for the share (or demand to be 
paid) a price of $500 (=$100/0.2).8 
Obviously, prices set in this manner should bear little or no relationship to the 
current level of profit. There are three reasons for the dissociation.  
First, since the price is determined on the basis of future earnings, there is no in-
herent reason for it to be correlated with profits that have already been earned. And 
that is just for starters. Note that future earnings, by their very nature, cannot be 
known with certainty and are forever conjectural. For this reason, investors discount 
not the profits they will earn, but the profits they expect to earn. In the case of Micro-
soft above, for example, investors can easily misjudge the perpetual future flow of 
earnings per share to be $50 or $400, instead of the eventual $100; this error will in 
turn cause them to price the company’s stock at $250 or $2000, respectively (=50/0.2 
or 400/0.2); and since profit expectations are rather open ended, the effect is to fur-
ther widen the disparity between price on the one hand and current earnings on the 
other. 
Second, a given level of expected earnings can generate any number of asset 
prices, depending on the discount rate of return. For instance, if the discount rate for 
Microsoft in our example were 10% (rather than 20%), the stock price would double 
to $1,000 (=$100/0.1). Now, the discount rate changes constantly – partly because of 
variations in the overall rate of interest and partly in response to changing percep-
tions of risk specific to the particular equity in question. And since in and of them-
selves these changes are unrelated to current earnings, the effect is to further reduce 
the correlation.  
Finally, investors are not always able to follow the rituals of finance with suffi-
cient precision. Regardless of how hard they try, their computations are constantly 
thrown off by various market “imperfections,” government “intervention” and other 
such diseases; and sometimes, particularly when the investors get excited, the calcu-
lations can even become “irrational,” god forbid. Now, since neither the miscalcula-
tions nor the irrationality are correlated with current profits, the result is to loosen 
the fit even more.  
So if we adhere to the scriptures of finance, we should expect to see no system-
atic association between equity prices and current profits. And given that most inves-
tors obey the scriptures – including the allowed imperfections and irrationalities – 
their actions tend to validate the “theory.”  
But not always.  
 
                                                 
8 The practical computation, of course, could be far more complicated, but the basic 
relationship between expected profits and the discount rate of return is always present. For a 
detailed critical examination of discounting, see Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, 
Capital as Power. A Study of Order and Creorder (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), Ch. 
11.  










Figure 2 shows two clear exceptions to the rule: the first occurred during the 1930s, 
the second during the 2000s. In both periods, which the chart shadows for easier 
visualization, equity prices moved together – and tightly so – with current earnings.  
Needless to say, this tight correlation is a gross violation of conventional, for-
ward-looking finance. In fact, the violation is far worse than it seems.  
Note that, despite their name, monthly earnings per share represent profits that 
were earned not during the current month, but during the previous twelve months. 
This measurement convention means that, during the 1930s, and again during the 
2000s, investors committed a cardinal sin. They priced assets based not on future 
earnings, and not even on current earnings, but on past earnings! 
What caused this sharp departure from conventional practice? Why would inves-
tors suddenly abandon their convenient forward-looking ceremony and instead take 
their cue from the dead past? Why give up the predictive powers of precise positivism 




In our view, the reason is systemic fear.  
Systemic fear has little to do with the habitual apprehension that constantly 
punctures capitalist greed. Business as usual is always uncertain, and investors are 
forever fearful about profit. They are concerned that earnings may not rise as quickly 
as they hope or that they might fall, that volatility will increase or that interest rates 
will rise. But these fears, no matter how intense, are self-contained. They concern the 
level and pattern of profit, not its existence.  
Occasionally, though, there arises a very different and far deeper type of fear: the 
terrifying thought that profit might cease to exist. This latter fear is associated with sys-
temic crisis – that is, with periods during which the very future of capitalism is put into 
question. It is what Hegel meant when he spoke of the bondsman’s “fear of death”: 
  
For this consciousness [of the capitalist bound to the steering wheel of a 
megamachine gone wild] was not in peril and fear for this element or that 
[such as falling profit or rising volatility], nor for this or that moment of time 
[like a sharp market correction or a declaration of war], it was afraid for its 
entire being; it felt the fear of death, the sovereign master [the ultimate wrath of 
the ruled]. It has been in that experience melted to its inmost soul, has trem-
bled throughout its every fibre, and all that was fixed and steadfast has 
quaked within it [will capitalism survive?]9 
                                                 
9 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, translated with an introduction 
and notes by J. B. Baillie, 2nd Revised ed. (London and New York: George Allen & Unwin 
and Humanities Press, 1807 [1971]), p. 237, emphases and contemporary parallels added. 
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The first time capitalists were gripped by such systemic terror was during the 




Let’s examine each of these periods more closely, beginning with the 1930s.  
Figure 3 “magnifies” the data from Figure 2 It focuses specifically on the period 
from the early 1920s to the end of the 1940s, with the shaded area denoting the pe-
riod of systemic crisis. For ease of comparison, the two series are rebased with Octo-
ber 1929=100 and plotted against an arithmetic scale.  
 
Figure 3 
























NOTE: Earnings per shares denote net profits per share earned in 
the previous twelve months. Both series are expressed in $U.S. and 
rebased with October 1929=100.  
 
SOURCE: Robert Shiller 
(http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/ie_data.xls retrieved on 
June 5, 2009). Stock price data are monthly averages of daily clos-
ing prices. Monthly earnings are interpolated from annual data be-
fore 1926 and from quarterly data after 1926. 






NITZAN AND BICHLER 
 
The data show that, during the happy 1920s, stock prices moved rather inde-
pendently of earnings, exactly as Graham and Dodd’s “new-era theory” decreed. But 
once the stock market crashed in 1929 and the Great Depression began, the “new-era 
theory” broke down: the two series, instead of moving independently of each other, 
suddenly converged and remained tightly locked for nearly a decade.  
Both series fell in tandem throughout the 1930-32 period, and then rose in tan-
dem from 1933 to 1936 – charting what initially looked like a V-shaped recovery. But 
the hopeful V soon became a disheartening W. In 1937, a new downturn began, and 
the two series, which briefly decoupled, again converged in a free fall. It was only in 
1939, after a decade of frustration, that the two series again diverged and that the 
new-era theorists could breathe a sigh of relief.  
The political-economic background of the period requires little elaboration. Dur-
ing much of the 1930s, the United States, along with the rest of the world, was mired 
in a systemic crisis. The very existence of capitalism was at stake, with liberalism 
fighting for its life against both communism and fascism.  
Few felt certain that capitalism would survive, and many – including some of the 
system’s leading advocates – feared its imminent demise. In this context, the “future 
trend of earnings” was no longer a very meaningful concept, and there was little 
point in extrapolating, let alone quantifying, its growth rate.   
There was no anchor ahead. All that was solid melted into air, all that was holy 
was profaned.  
And so, in despair, forward-looking investors found themselves latching onto the 
only “real” thing they could see: the past.  
Like the Aymara Indians of South America, they suddenly realized that the fu-
ture was behind them.10  
Their assets still represented a claim over the future, but the only way to price 
that future was to look backward, to what the assets had already earned.  
The pricing anomaly ended in 1939. Suddenly, the disorder dissipated, optimism 
re-emerged and history could again be forgotten. The onset of the Second World 
War and the boom that ensued sent profit soaring. And the capitalists, cajoled by the 
apparent efficacy of the new welfare-warfare state, regained their confidence. They 
abandoned the stale past, returned to their forward-looking rituals and resumed the 
discounting of expected future earnings.  
  
                                                 
10 The Aymara language, spoken by Indians in Southern Peru and Northern Chile, reverses the 
directional-temporal order of most languages. It treats the known past as being “in front of us” 
and the unknown future as lying “behind us.” To test this inverted perception, just look up at 
the stars: ahead of you you’ll see nothing but the past (see Rafael E. Núñez, and Eve Sweetser, 
“With the Future Behind Them: Convergent Evidence from Aymara Language and Gesture in 
the Crosslinguistic Comparison of Spatial Construals of Time,” Cognitive Science: A Multidisci-
plinary Journal, 2006, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 401-450). 
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The 2000s 
 
This situation lasted for sixty years. During that period, capitalism went through 
many ups and downs, and there was the occasional scare that sent markets reeling. 
But none of the jolts was serious enough to evoke the Hegelian fear of death. At no 
point was the existence of the system itself in doubt. It was business as usual, with 
greed and fear easily incorporated into future earnings projections and risk calcula-
tions. The financial model seemed to work like clockwork.  
But in 2000, the machine stopped. The threat of a new systemic crisis suddenly 
loomed large, and the specter of backward-looking pricing, having been dormant for 
decades, returned to haunt the markets. 
Figure 4 displays price and earnings per share data from 1970 to the present, 
with the shaded area denoting a period of systemic crisis (the two series again are 
rebased – this time with December 2007=100 – and graphed against an arithmetic 
scale).  
As the figure shows, until the early 2000s both series trended upwards. But in 
line with the “new-era theory” (which by now had become mainstream finance), the 
short term correlation between them remained loose and often negative. During that 
period, earnings have gone through several sharp declines. For instance, in the end-
of-communism crisis of 1989-1991 they dropped 37%, and following the emerging 
markets scare of 1997-1998 they fell 6% – yet in both cases stock prices continued to 
soar. And conversely, in 1972-1974 earnings increased by 42%, while prices dropped 
by 43%; similarly, at the end of 1987 earnings increased by 14% while prices dropped 
by 27% (the latter divergences are seen more clearly on the logarithmic plot of Figure 
2). 
All in all, then, investors seemed perfectly happy to obey the theory. Throughout 
the period, they ignored the ephemeral present in favor of the eternal future.   
But in 2000, they suddenly lost their forward-looking vision. The dotcom crash 
and the end of the “new economy,” together with the collapse of the Twin Towers 
and the onset of an “infinite war on terror,” signaled the beginning of a new era of 
uncertainty. Analysts started to debate the end of the Washington Consensus, strate-
gists deliberated over the decline of the “American Empire,” and culturalists la-
mented the demise of the “global village.”  
It is true that, initially, nobody was seriously contemplating the “end of capital-
ism.” But capitalists nonetheless started to grow wary. This was no longer business 
as usual, and the trajectory of future profits, which in previous decades had appeared 
neatly bounded and relatively easy to project, suddenly looked murky. 
And so, once again, the capitalists found themselves with their backs to the fu-
ture. Instead of projecting the earning trend looking forward, they began to watch 
earnings as they unfolded and discount their past declines.   
 

































NOTE: Earnings per shares denote net profits per share earned in 
the previous twelve months. Both series are expressed in $U.S. and 
rebased with December 2007=100.  
 
SOURCE: Robert Shiller 
(http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/ie_data.xls retrieved on 
June 5, 2009). Stock price data are monthly averages of daily clos-
ing prices. Monthly earnings are interpolated from quarterly data. 
 
By the middle of 2002, the crisis finally ended. Earnings staged a massive, 
V-shaped recovery and, over the next five years, rose by nearly 350%. And yet, de-
spite the surge, capitalists still found the future hard to envisage. The earnings boom 
certainly was real enough – but so were its limits. In the United States, the national 
income share of corporate profits was hitting record highs, so the prospect for further 
redistribution in favor of capitalists seemed increasingly dim. And those who pinned 
their hopes on “real” growth were running into doomsday scenarios of “peak oil” 
and “climate tipping.”  
With the future looking disheartening at best, capitalists preferred to keep their 
eyes on the past. Share prices started to rise only in October 2002, a full six months 
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after the earnings upswing began, and they continued to increase in tandem with 
profits (albeit at a lower rate) for the next five years. 
And then all hell broke loose. 
 
All Bets are Off 
 
The contours of the current crisis are still unfolding, but one thing seems clear 
enough: the capitalist class has lost its self-confidence.  
“Uncertainty is the only certain thing in this crisis,” bemoan the editors of the 
Financial Times. As of today, nobody knows what is going to happen: 
 
[A] dense fog of confusion has . . . descended, obscuring where we are – fal-
ling fast, slowly, bumping along the bottom, or finally turning the cor-
ner. . . . Economies are behaving unpredictably and will continue to do so. 
The instability is both cause and consequence of the great uncertainty that 
has been spreading out from the financial markets. Fearful and confused, 
people react erratically to changing news, reinforcing confused market be-
havour. It doesn’t help that our economic theories were constructed for a 
different world. Most models depict economies close to equilibrium. . . . 
And unlike what most models assume, prices are not properly clearing all 
markets. . . . [etc. etc.]11 
 
This sentiment is echoed in numerous publications and speeches, academic and 
popular. “The whole intellectual edifice . . . collapsed in the summer of last year,” 
concedes former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan.12 “[T]he pillars of faith on which 
this new financial capitalism were built have all but collapsed,” observes Gillian Tett 
in a special Financial Times series on the future of capitalism, and that collapse, she 
concludes, “has left everyone from finance minister or central banker to small inves-
tor or pension holder bereft of an intellectual compass, dazed and confused.13 And 
with no intellectual compass to rely on, confesses Bank of England Governor Mer-
vyn King, “[J]udging the balance of influences on the economy” becomes “extraor-
dinary difficult.”14 
But perhaps the clearest evidence for this loss of confidence is the “fear of death 
indicator”: the persistence of a backward-looking stock market.  
As Figure 4 shows, since their 2007 peak, earnings have fallen by 80% – a drop 
comparable to the earning collapse in the first three years of the Great Depression 
depicted in Figure 3. If capitalism is here to stay, this must be the mother of all in-
                                                 
11 Editors, “Sound and Fury in the World Economy,” Financial Times, May 16, 2009, p. 6. 
12 Edmund L. Andrews, “Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation,” New York Times, 
October 23, 2008, p. 1. 
13 Gillian Tett, “Lost Through Destructive Creation,” FT Series: Future of Capitalism, 
Financial Times, March 10, 2009, p. 9.  
14 Editors, “Sound and Fury in the World Economy,” Financial Times, May 16, 2009, p. 6. 
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vestment opportunities. As the system recovers, profits are bound to rebound – and, 
from their current lows, the rise could be spectacular indeed.   
A shrewd academic would probably have developed this apparent “anomaly” 
into a full-blown mechanized model, complete with a universal taxonomy of “fear-
of-death” eras, a menu that alerts investors when to switch and reswitch between 
forward- and backward-looking postures, and an easy to follow list of “how to profit” 
from both. And judging by what is on sale in the analysis market, this model could 
end up having plenty of paying followers.  
We prefer to forego this investment opportunity and instead keep our specula-
tions tentative and free. It seems to us that some investors must be feeling the greedy 
itch of an overly discounted market, and that this itch may explain the recent rise in 
equity prices shown in Figure 1. But for most investors, all bets are still off. This is a 
period of systemic crisis, a social upheaval in which the very future of capitalism is in 
question. And as long as capitalists continue to doubt their own future, they are 
likely to remain dubious of the models that describe this future and hesitant to apply 
the pricing rituals that these models dictate.15 
Capitalism may survive this upheaval, as it survived the Great Depression. But 
its continuation may well entail a significant transformation – one that restructures 
both the architecture of power and the ideology of the powerful.  
This is the transformation capitalists are eagerly waiting for. And until this trans-
formation gets under way, backward-looking prices seem here to stay.    
 
[ [ [ 
 
Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler are co-authors of Capital as Power: A Study of 
Order and Creorder, RIPE series in Global Political Economy (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2009). All their publications are freely available from The Bichler & 
Nitzan Archives (http://bnarchives.net)  
                                                 
15 Note that the latest earnings-per-share reading in Figure 4 is for December 2008, whereas 
the most recent price datum is for May 2009. This gap means that the early 2009 increase in 
prices could end up being correlated with a yet-to-be reported rise in current earnings. . . . 
